NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS

EURIPIDES *HERACLES* 1351 AND THE HERO'S ENCOUNTER WITH DEATH

On recovering his sanity and discovering that he has murdered his family, Heracles resolves to commit suicide. After the timely arrival of Theseus, he changes his mind, but not because of his friend's reasoning. Instead, he pointedly rejects part of Theseus' argument (*Her.* 1340–46),[1] then discovers his own motive for living on (1347–52):

> ἐσκεψάμην δὲ καίπερ ἐν κακοῖσιν ὢν
> μὴ δειλίαν ὄφλω τιν' ἐκλιπὼν φάος·
> ταῖς συμφοραῖς γὰρ ὅστις οὐχ ὑφίσταται
> οὐδ' ἀνδρὸς ἂν δύναιθ' ὑποστῆναι βέλος. 1350
> ἐγκαρτερήσω θάνατον· εἶμι δ' ἐς πόλιν
> τὴν σήν, χάριν τε μυρίαν (Wakefield: μυρίων **L**) δώρων ἔχω.

So the *codex unicus* **L**. While some scholars accept θάνατον in 1351 with little or no comment, many, including the editors of the OCT and Teubner texts and the most recent commentator on the play, follow Wilamowitz in preferring Wecklein's βίοτον.[2] In this paper, I defend θάνατον by adding several arguments to those advanced by W. Kranz in a short note published seventy years ago.[3] I show that the change to ἐγκαρτερήσω βίοτον, understood as "I will endure life," requires attributing to the verb a meaning that it did not have in the fifth century and that is only weakly attested later. Establishing for ἐγκαρτερήσω θάνατον a meaning like "ich werde standhaft sein gegenüber dem Tode," however, proves much more difficult than Kranz supposed, and the nature of the evidence makes a detailed and at times indirect argument

1. The ethical dimension of Heracles' dilemma is discussed by S. Yoshitake, "Disgrace, Grief, and Other Ills: Herakles' Rejection of Suicide," *JHS* 114 (1994): 135–53, the theological by H. Yunis, *A New Creed: Fundamental Religious Beliefs in the Athenian Polis and Euripidean Drama,* Hypomnemata 91 (Göttingen, 1988), 139–71. In choosing to live to avoid a charge of cowardice, Heracles develops a theme barely hinted at by Theseus (1250).

The abbreviations in this article may be deciphered with the help of the *Oxford Classical Dictionary,* the *Greek-English Lexicon* of Liddell, Scott, and Jones, and *L'Année philologique,* except that I write *Heracles* (*Her.*) for Euripides' play of that name. Note also that *LIMC* = *Lexicon Iconographicum Mythologiae Classicae* (Zurich, 1981–).

2. *Euripidis Fabulae*[3], ed. G. Murray, vol. 2 (Oxford, 1913); *Euripidis Fabulae,* ed. J. Diggle, vol. 2 (Oxford, 1981); *Euripides: "Hercules,"* ed. K. H. Lee (Leipzig, 1988); *Euripides: "Heracles,"* ed. G. W. Bond (Oxford, 1981); *Euripides: "Herakles,"*[2] ed. U. v. Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (Berlin, 1895; reprint, Darmstadt, 1959). Wecklein's conjecture appears in his revision of A. Pflugk's edition (Leipzig, 1877). A. Palmer made the same conjecture at *Hermathena* 13 (1887): 230–31. I leave aside Heimsoeth's πότμον, accepted by A. E. Housman, *CR* 17 (1903): 310 (= *Classical Papers,* ed. J. Diggle and F. R. D. Goodyear, vol. 2 [Cambridge, 1972], 594).

3. "ΕΓΚΑΡΤΕΡΗΣΩ ΘΑΝΑΤΟΝ," *PhW* 47 (1927): 138–39 (= *Studien zur antiken Literatur und ihrem Fortwirken. Kleine Schriften,* ed. E. Vogt [Heidelberg, 1967], 307). See also L. Parmentier, "Sur l'*Héraclès* d'Euripide," *RPh* 44 (1920): 164–65, and E. Kroeker, "Der *Herakles* des Euripides" (Ph.D. diss., Leipzig, 1938), 139. Many scholars accept the transmitted reading with little or no comment.

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unavoidable. Nevertheless, this argument both vindicates Kranz and points the way to a new appreciation of this vitally important passage.[4]

The disputed words occur at exactly the point where an audience expects Heracles to announce his decision to live. If they do not accomplish this, the following words (εἶμι δ' ἐς πόλιν / τὴν σὴν κτλ.) are abrupt and confusing, and Heracles nowhere announces his decision clearly. But if ἐγκαρτερεῖν means "endure," emendation is necessary, for Heracles is not going to "endure death."[5] The difficulty cannot be evaded by changing to ἐγκαρτερήσων (Madvig) or ἐγκαρτερήσας (Kirchhoff), because subordinating the first part of 1351 to the preceding sentence fails to meet the principal requirement of the passage, that it contain a clear announcement of Heracles' decision to live.[6] Some keep the meaning "endure" and interpret θάνατον as "temptation of death" or "threat of death," but editors rightly judge these unsupported improvisations unconvincing.[7]

If the premise is correct, θάνατον is indefensible. The case for the meaning "endure," set out most fully by Bond, may be quickly reviewed. The only other classical occurrence of ἐγκαρτερεῖν followed by an accusative is Euripides *Andromache* 262, where the noun is again θάνατον. Hermione, threatening Andromache with immolation on the altar of Thetis, asks ἐγκαρτερεῖς δὴ θάνατον; Bond writes that the meaning is "endure with resolution." But Andromache does not endure death: she remains quite alive, and the words refer to her present attitude of defiance.[8] Bond next adduces Thucydides 2.61.2: ἐγκαρτερεῖν ἃ ἔγνωτε, which he translates "to continue resolutely in what you determined." This passage, however, contributes nothing to decision at *Heracles* 1351, for two reasons. First, on grammatical grounds and the evidence of later usage (see pp. 249–50 below), the suppressed antecedent of ἃ ἔγνωτε must be understood to be τούτοις. The second and related reason is that "to continue resolutely in" is semantically quite distinct from "to endure" (transitively). The Athenians are indeed enduring hardship, but that hardship, which Pericles refers to as an unforeseen μεταβολή (he is thinking mainly of the plague), is not what they resolved (ἃ ἔγνωτε). The point of his exhortation, as accurately reflected in Bond's

4. As an English translation, I suggest "I will brave death," which I believe is versatile in ways resembling the Greek (see further p. 253 below).

5. At least not soon. Bond rightly rejects the interpretation "wait until my natural death," which he attributes to F. A. Paley (*Euripides with an English Commentary*[3] [London, 1880]). A more accurate representation of the view Paley adopted from Pflugk would be "await death bravely" (cf. "await steadfastly," LSJ s.v. ἐγκαρτερέω, citing our passage and *Andr.* 262), but this is not convincing either.

6. So Wecklein, Wilamowitz, and Bond.

7. "Temptation of death": Parmentier, "Sur l'*Héraclès*," 164 and in his translation in the Budé series (*Euripide*, vol. 3 [Paris, 1923], 72); D. Ebener (*Euripides. Tragödien*, vol. 3 [Berlin, 1976], 97 and "Selbstverwirklichung des Menschen im euripideischen *Herakles*," *Philologus* 125 [1981]: 176–80, at 179); Kroeker, *Herakles*, 139; J. Bremer (*Mnem.* 30 [1977]: 199). "Threat of death" is a common interpretation of θάνατον at *Andr.* 262, adapted by Kranz (who of course does not keep the meaning "endure") to *Her.* 1351 ("den . . . ihn gleichsam von innen bedrohenden Tod"). Bond, who eventually rejects the idea, cites *Andr.* 428 προύτεινα παιδὸς θάνατον in support, but there προύτεινα conveys the threat.

8. Translate: "Are you strong (steadfast, defiant, brave) in the face of death?" This is what P. T. Stevens, who retains θάνατον at *Her.* 1351, means by "face death with resolution"; that is, he recognizes that one can face death without necessarily enduring it in the immediate context (*Euripides: "Andromache"* [Oxford, 1971], ad loc.). Evidently editors find this meaning unacceptable at *Her.* 1351, at least without further clarification or argument. Transitive ἐ[γκαρτερ]εῖν was restored by R. Cantarella at Aesch. frag. 78a33, but the papyrus has traces incompatible with γ, according to S. L. Radt, *Tragicorum Graecorum Fragmenta*, vol. 3 (Göttingen, 1985).

translation, is that if they are not too weak to persevere in their war strategy, the Athenians may yet prevail.[9]

These two passages do not support the conclusion that "the fifth-century usage, such as it is, points to 'endure', not 'resist'."[10] If editors remain uncomfortable with the paradosis, we may suspect two causes.[11] First, as we have seen, defenders of θάνατον, including Kranz, smuggle a threat or temptation into the expression, notions that may be contextually appropriate but do not correspond to anything in the Greek. This maneuver leads to a second complaint: it has not been shown that an accusative following ἐγκαρτερεῖν can express something prevented by the action of the verb, as Heracles means death to be. After all, at *Andromache* 262 Hermione expects Andromache to die despite her attitude of defiance. Bond explicitly assumes, and others probably do as well, that ἐγκαρτερεῖν includes the notion that she will "endure" death.

We have seen how little there is in fifth-century usage to support this assumption; later Greek provides hardly more support. "To endure" (transitively) was never a regular meaning of ἐγκαρτερεῖν. In well over two hundred instances it is used absolutely or with dative.[12] Indeed, this is what we should expect after an intransitive verb formation[13] compounded with ἐν-.[14] Only six passages of late authors provide

9. Xen. *Eq. Mag.* 8.22 δυνήσονται ἃ ἂν γνῶσιν ἐγκαρτερεῖν is precisely similar to Thuc. 2.61.2 both syntactically and semantically; the uses of καρτερεῖν at Pl. *Cra.* 395A and *Menex.* 244E belong to the same semantic nexus but must be considered absolute (without grammatical object), as in each of them a verb that would govern an acc. (διαπονεῖσθαι in *Cra.*, διαφυλάξαι in *Menex.*) is coordinated with καρτερεῖν and stands closer to the relative clause. The meaning "persevere in" an attitude or belief persists in later usage, but never with an acc. after ἐγκαρτερεῖν (see n. 12 below).

10. Bond adds that "ἐγκαρτερήσω sounds too much like ἀποκαρτερήσω, which unambiguously means 'I will commit suicide'." This argument requires no rebuttal. When he comments that βίοτον "gives a firm decision," he is echoing earlier commentators' objection to ἐγκαρτερήσων (see n. 6 above); nevertheless, I will try to show that θάνατον gives a decision of all desirable firmness. Plut. *Mor.* 987e, cited by Bond at p. 403, n. 1, adds nothing to his case.

11. I thank David Kovacs for discussion leading to clarification of this point. In print, scholars have either confined themselves to disagreement about the meaning of ἐγκαρτερεῖν ("endure" or "standhaft sein gegenüber") or merely expressed opinions as to which noun (θάνατον, βίοτον, or πότμον) best suits the themes of the play.

12. Passages retrieved by a search of the TLG D disk. After Xenophon our verb first shows up again (Arist. *Rh.* 1377a7b being interpolated) in Σ Pind. *Nem.* 3.72b (attributed to Didymus) and Diodorus, whose thirteen instances include ten with dat. τοῖς δεινοῖς. This is also a fixed expression for later authors, especially Christians writing about perseverance under torture. Plutarch, who is fond of the verb, uses it in three ways: abs. and with dat. in the context of a variety of feats of perseverance (e.g., *Pomp.* 79.4, *Caes.* 17.2, *Ant.* 47.7), and with dat. of an attitude or belief to which one "holds fast" (e.g., *Per.* 36.9, *Cat. Mai.* 4.3). This last, which accords with the usage illustrated in n. 9 above, is also popular with Christian authors, e.g., ἐγκαρτερεῖν τοῖς δεδογμένοις (Syn. *Ep.* 67.278, Origen *Frag. in Lament.* 76.3).

13. In origin and in the dominant usage at all periods, καρτερεῖν means "be καρτερός" (cf. Schwyzer 1.726). The adj., also in the form κρατερός, is common in epic; on the alternate vocalizations (the former only Attic), see P. Chantraine, *Grammaire Homérique,* vol. 1 (Paris, 1958), 24–25. The etymological dictionaries of Chantraine and Frisk relate καρτερός only to κράτος, but to account for the negative connotations of some instances, E. Benveniste argues for a convergence of roots meaning "powerful, authoritative" and "hard" precisely in this adjective (*Le Vocabulaire des institutions indo-européennes,* vol. 2 [Paris, 1969], 71–83). It may seem that a straight line leads from "hard" to "endure," but in fact the comparative linguistic evidence offers no support for ἐγκαρτερεῖν as "endure" rather than "stand firm," both because of its formation and because the roots have become thoroughly entangled already in epic. When used of heroes, words in this family refer to fighting spirit and ability, both might and hardness precisely in the sense of standing firm against an opponent. See further below, n. 44.

14. Several preverbs regularly combine with intransitive simplicia to make transitive compounds, but ἐν- is not one of them (Schwyzer 2:72–73).

accusative objects. In what is probably the earliest, that object is again θάνατον, and the context again points to a present attitude towards a death that has not occurred and may not.[15] The remaining five constitute the only evidence that an accusative after ἐγκαρτερεῖν represents an experience that actually occurs.[16] In view of their date and number, we are entitled to doubt whether the connection between the action of the verb and the occurrence of the noun that follows it was a necessary one for Euripides. In effect, Kranz tried to show that it is not necessary by citing passages in which καρτερεῖν and ἐγκαρτερεῖν emphasize a sufferer's mental and physical toughness in contexts of pain, need, and temptation (rather than the mere fact that these experiences occur). This semantic analysis, which applies also to the late passages with accusative objects, is in my view unquestionably correct, but Kranz did not adequately address the syntactic problem,[17] and when faced with a non-occurring death, he flinched and resorted to paraphrases that import the "threat" or "thought" of death.

We must try to remedy these deficiencies, but first it will be useful to glance at the usage of καρτερεῖν, which has a slight bearing on both. To begin with, Kranz did not cite two tragic passages in which καρτερεῖν is followed by an accusative. At Euripides *Alcestis* 1071, the Chorus say χρὴ δ', ἥτις ἐστί, καρτερεῖν θεοῦ δόσιν. Although the words lend themselves to interpretation on multiple levels, what the gods have given is, most immediately, the death of Alcestis, and we may say that Admetus must "endure" this gift. At Aeschylus frag. 99.15–16, the accusative object is labor pains (τοὺς γυναικείους πόνους). Even if we accept the meaning "endure" for these two passages, however, the most we can get from this for the compound is an argument for analogical force affecting *Andromache* 262 and *Heracles* 1351. Both the paucity of examples and the compound's formation make this a weak argument.[18] Further, while the objects in these cases represent events that actually occur, they also belong to contexts in which it is standard to call for an attitude of toughness and resolve. Similarly outside tragedy: while most examples are absolute, we do find accusative objects expressing actually occurring events or experiences, and these establish the

15. Philostr. *VA* 7.26.4. Apollonius finds himself among the inmates of a prison, some of whom ἐγκαρτερεῖν τὸν θάνατον while others are sick or gloomy or ἐπιβοᾶσθαι τέκνα καὶ γονέας τοὺς αὐτῶν καὶ γάμους. The prisoners are all awaiting trail; they expect a death sentence because of the emperor's habitual cruelty. Even more than in Eur. *Andr.* 262, their fate lies in a hypothetical future.

16. βασάνους Origen *c. Cels.* 8.66.6; λύπας Them. *Or.* 7.99a2; τὰ δεινότατα Procop. *Goth.* 2.26.25, 4.12.11; τὰ τοῦ πλοὸς ἐπίπονα (Joh. Cameniates *de expugnat. Thess.* 6.2.1). Add Aesop. *fab.* 217 (aliter).9 Chambry, where the object is ταῦτα (indignities inflicted on dogs by humans) if ἐγκαρτερεῖτε is correctly restored. At Anna Comnena *Alex.* 8.8.2, τὴν ἄφιξιν ἐγκαρτερῆσαι means "await the arrival," rather long-awaited support for Pflugk's interpretation of *Her.* 1351 (see n. 5 above).

17. For ἐγκαρτερεῖν, Kranz cited Thuc. 2.61.2, Xen. *Eq. Mag.* 8.22, Plut. *Mor.* 987e, and Xen. *Mem.* 2.6.22 (MSS divided between ἐγκαρτερεῖν and καρτερεῖν). On the first two, see n. 9 above with text. For syntactic purposes, the last two must also be discarded, as the usage is abs. For καρτερεῖν, Kranz cited three passages in which it is abs. (Thuc. 2.44.2, Eur. *Alc.* 1078, Xen. *Cyr.* 2.3.13) and two in which the acc. is internal (Soph. *Aj.* 650, Eur. *IA* 1370, the latter misinterpreted by LSJ). Xen. *Mem.* 1.6.7 provides the only external acc. in the lot, but it is not the kind needed, for there τὰ συντυγχάνοντα (shown by the context to be cold, heat, hunger, thirst, and pain) are experiences that actually occur for Socrates, who thus endures them even if he is also strong in the face of them.

18. The remaining dozen or so tragic instances of καρτερεῖν provide no acc. objects. As for the argument linking simplex and compound, I find no comparandum for the pair καρτερεῖν/ἐγκαρτερεῖν, where the aim is to prove that both can have the same transitive meaning. For the semantically relevant μένειν/ἐμμένειν, there seem to be no examples of acc. after the compound. On the predictably transitive ὑπομένειν, see p. 252 below.

usage, though it appears not to be early or common.[19] But again the context, as indeed with all instances of both simplex and compounds, is always one in which a resolute attitude is called for, and this is what the writers wish to emphasize by their choice of these words, as would not necessarily be so if they used, say, παθεῖν. To the extent that it is felt as a transitive synonym of "experience," then, "endure" is justifiable as a translation of καρτερεῖν in only a small number of cases, and it is possibly misleading in those.[20]

To sum up, the attested usage of ἐγκαρτερεῖν removes one argument for altering the text of *Heracles* 1351 (or nearly so, since it now depends on a small number of passages written six to twelve centuries after Euripides): the verb did not regularly mean "endure" (transitively). On the other hand, among the few passages with accusatives after καρτερεῖν (classical) or ἐγκαρτερεῖν (post-classical), none supports understanding θάνατον as an event or experience prevented by the action of the verb. The way out of this impasse is given by two new arguments.[21] First, certain other verbs have a good claim to have exercised analogical influence on ἐγκαρτερεῖν at *Heracles* 1351. Second, there exists a justifiable and indeed welcome way of interpreting θάνατον here as something other than an event or experience; namely, as an opponent. We shall see that the two arguments work together.

First, analogy. Like καρτερεῖν, θαρρεῖν "take heart, be confident" is usually intransitive and often occurs with a prepositional phrase and refers to martial spirit.[22] In only one passage of tragedy is θαρρεῖν followed by an accusative object in the sense "be confident against": at Euripides *Andromache* 993, Orestes tells Hermione θάρσει γέροντος χεῖρα.[23] The usage can be paralleled in prose but is never

19. Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.15 (cold, heat, sleeplessness; like *Mem.* 1.6.7, adduced by Kranz), *Mem.* 4.5.9 (hunger, thirst), *Oec.* 7.23 (cold, heat, military marching and campaigning), Isoc. 1.30 (τὸν τῶν ὑπεροπτικῶν ὄγκον). For καρτερεῖν I do not claim the completeness I have tried to attain for ἐγκαρτερεῖν. But καρτερεῖν does not seem to be used with dat.; although one could explain μάχῃ at Eur. *Heracl.* 837, this may be added to the reasons for retaining **L**'s μάχῃ there.

20. In a few passages, the action of (ἐγ)καρτερεῖν does prevent the occurrence of something, though it is not expressed as an acc. object. For example, Hippolytus, responding to his father's plea μή νυν προδῷς με, τέκνον, ἀλλὰ καρτέρει, says κεκαρτέρηται τἄμ' (Eur. *Hipp.* 1456–57); once his effort to καρτερεῖν ends, he dies. Similarly, Xenophon's Socrates, explaining that good people exercise restraint in the fulfillment of their desires, gives as an example δύνανται . . . τοῖς τῶν ὡραίων ἀφροδισίοις ἡδόμενοι καρτερεῖν, ὥστε μὴ λυπεῖν οὓς μὴ δεῖ (*Mem.* 2.6.22). Through the effort of καρτερεῖν, the desired sexual relations with inappropriate partners do not occur. Again, at Plut. *Ages.* 11.7, Agesilaus resists sexual temptation, but with such difficulty that it is hard to say whether, if the object of his attentions had appeared again, ἐνεκαρτέρησε μὴ φιληθῆναι. In the latter two passages the meaning is close to "resist."

21. I continue to leave aside manuscript authority and treat θάνατον and βίοτον as though they were variants. I note, however, that the attempts of editors to account for the alleged corruption seem to me desperate. Wilamowitz writes that substitution of θάνατον for βίοτον was "kein Schreibfehler: da hat vielmehr die gemeine Menschenansicht geändert, die es zwar für schwer hält zu sterben, aber nicht begreift, daß zu leben unendlich viel schwerer ist." In my opinion, the commonplace "endure life" is unendurably banal compared to Euripides' expression as I understand it. Nor does Wilamowitz explain how the corrector, uninspired though he was, contented himself with a text in which Heracles announces that he will endure death at the very moment when it is imperative that he declare an intention to live. Bond faces this problem ("For the slipshod reader there is sufficient paradox to make the corruption plausible") but does not solve it. The other possible causes of corruption cited by Bond (recollection of *Andr.* 262, scribal substitution of an antonym) will have no appreciable weight if the viability of θάνατον in its present context can be demonstrated.

22. Prepositional phrase: ἐς τὰ ἄλλα Thuc. 6.65.1, εἰς τοὺς πολεμίους Xen. *Cyr.* 2.2.15, ἐπὶ τῷ πολέμῳ Polyb. 5.29.4. Martial spirit: Thuc. 2.79.5, 4.34.1, 6.31.1. The two verbs are joined at Pl. *Tht.* 157D ἀλλὰ θαρρῶν καὶ καρτερῶν εὖ καὶ ἀνδρείως ἀπόκρινον.

23. The only other tragic instance with acc. is Soph. *OC* 649, on which see next note.

common.[24] One passage is of particular interest here: at Plato *Phaedo* 88B, Cebes says that if the soul's immortality has not yet been proven, then οὐδενὶ προσήκει θάνατον θαρροῦντι μὴ οὐκ ἀνοήτως θαρρεῖν.[25] Death will doubtless occur, but Cebes refers to an attitude in the face of death, the confident belief that one will somehow survive it.

Similarly ὑφίστασθαι, with some kinds of objects, means "submit to, endure" (ἔρωτα *Tro.* 415; ἄθλων ἕνα *Temenidai* frag. 740.3; ἀγῶνας Thuc. 3.57.3), with others "undertake" (πόνον Eur. *Supp.* 189, 345; *Rhes.* 157; πλοῦν Thuc. 4.28.4), and with still others "withstand, stand up to" (βέλος *Her.* 1350; κίνδυνον Thuc. 2.61.1), as regularly with persons in a military context (ὄχλον Φρυγῶν *Cyc.* 199–200; [ἄνδρα] *Rhes.* 315, σε 375; Μήδους Thuc. 1.144.4).[26] So also ὑπομένειν, with some objects, means "submit to, endure" (δουλείαν Thuc. 1.8.3 [cf. Pl. *Leg.* 770E]; ἀλγηδόνα Pl. *Grg.* 478C; πνῖγος Aristophon frag. 10.6), but with others "withstand, stand up to" (ἔγχος [Eur.] *Rhes.* 463; οἷα [military challenges] ἐπιόντα ὑπέμειναν κατά τε γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν Pl. *Menex.* 241A),[27] as regularly with persons in a military context (Hom. *Il.* 16.814, 17.25, 174; Hdt. 7.120.2, 202).[28] Plato's usage is illuminating in two ways. First, he joins ὑπομένειν and καρτερεῖν in two passages (ὑπομένειν τε καὶ καρτερεῖν ἐν . . . στρατοπέδῳ *Lach.* 193A; ὑπομένοντα καρτερεῖν ὅπου δεῖ *Grg.* 507B; both military).[29] Second, he uses the combination τὸν θάνατον ὑπομένειν in a context where it must mean "stand firm in the face of" rather than "endure" (*Phd.* 68D): οὐκοῦν φόβῳ μειζόνων κακῶν ὑπομένουσιν αὐτῶν οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι τὸν θάνατον, ὅταν ὑπομένωσιν. Just as those who ὑπομένουσιν a military opponent may prevail, so these warriors, who (Plato's Socrates paradoxically asserts) brave death through fear, may escape it on any given occasion. Like θάνατον θαρρεῖν at 88B, then, the passage describes an attitude in the face of death.

The analogical support of these verbs is of two distinct kinds. Although the semantic range of all three is similar to that of ἐγκαρτερεῖν, the attested usage of θαρρεῖν is such that a single passage of Euripides stands alone in tragedy and finds

24. The closest is τὸ τοιοῦτον σῶμα Pl. *Phdr.* 239D; other shades of meaning τόνδε γ' ἄεθλον Hom. *Od.* 8.197, πάντα Hdt. 7.50.1, μάχας Xen. *An.* 3.2.20, τὸ ἀποκρίνασθαι Pl. *Euthd.* 275C. With persons the meaning "feel confident towards" merges with "have confidence in, trust": Xen. *Cyr.* 5.5.42, Dem. 3.7, Arist. *Rh.* 1381b33. Soph. *OC* 649 θάρσει τὸ τοῦδέ γ' ἀνδρός probably belongs here.

25. Cf. *Ap.* 34E ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν θαρραλέως ἐγὼ ἔχω πρὸς θάνατον, recalled by both the phrasing and the argument of *Phd.* 88B.

26. So dat. μεγάλῳ ῥεύματι φωτῶν Aesch. *Pers.* 87, τοῖς ἀπονενοημένοις ("desperados") Xen. *Hell.* 7.5.12. Abs. use in military context: Eur. *Phoen.* 1470, Thuc. 4.54.2, Xen. *An.* 3.2.11; cf. Eur. *Antigone* frag. 177, where Dionysus is θνητοῖς . . . οὐδαμῶς ὑποστατός (Scaliger: ὑποστάτης codd.). Some objects do not fit neatly into one of these categories, often because of a hint that "enduring" and "overcoming" are both involved in "standing up to" (so κινδύνους Thuc. 4.59.2, Lys. 9.7; ταῖς συμφοραῖς Eur. *Her.* 1349, Thuc. 2.61.4).

27. So with reference to things that have not yet happened and may not: τὴν μέλλουσαν δουλήϊην Hdt. 6.12.3; cf. κινδύνους Gorgias 82 B 8 DK, Isoc. 6.70; ἀπειλάς Dem. 21.3.

28. Cf. τὰς Σειρῆνας Xen. *Mem.* 2.6.31, τὸν λῖν . . . τὸν ἄγριον Theoc. 13.6 (subject Heracles). So also the simplex μένειν with persons (Hom. *Il.* 3.52, 5.527, 13.476, 15.622), used in this way by Aesch. (ἄνδρας πολεμίους *Pers.* 243, ἄνδρα *Sept.* 436), and by Eur. with δόρυ as object (*Heracl.* 744, *El.* 388–89; cf. *Her.* 163–64).

29. Cf. ἐπὶ τῇ ζητήσει ἐπιμείνωμέν τε καὶ καρτερήσωμεν, *Lach.* 194E, Σ Pind. *Nem.* 3.72b (ἐμμένειν and ἐγκαρτερεῖν together), Ael. *NA* 17.40 (ὑπομένειν and ἐγκαρτερεῖν). A semantic group is recognized by K–G 1:295–96, who list καρτερεῖν, ἐγκαρτερεῖν, and ὑφίστασθαι (ὑποστῆναι), but not ὑπομένειν, among "Verben des Ausharrens, Wartens und des Gegenteils davon" that take an acc. But they do not differentiate among the acc. objects, cite no examples of καρτερεῖν, and give only Thuc. 2.61.2 and Xen. *Eq. Mag.* 8.22 (on which see n. 9 above) for ἐγκαρτερεῖν.

only sparse (if adequate) support in prose; yet it is unassailable. The other two verbs, by contrast, occur often with accusative objects expressing both experiences that occur and potential experiences or opponents. Crucially, in examples of the latter type, ὑφίστασθαι and ὑπομένειν do not anticipate the outcome of the contest. Because they are well attested across this range of meanings, these two verbs offer a reasonable analogical source for the usage of ἐγκαρτερεῖν at *Andromache* 262 and *Heracles* 1351.

Whether or not Heracles' expression is daring, it receives ample support from its immediate context. First, after taking thought for his reputation if he commits suicide and drawing an analogy with bravery in battle, Heracles can only conclude "I will live," and an audience will extract that meaning from his words if it is in any way possible. Second, Heracles' scruple and his analogy come from the very context that provides a convincing analogical source for his climactic words, and the verb ὑφίστασθαι itself occurs twice in the two lines preceding 1351. One of the complements (ταῖς συμφοραῖς, 1349) is an actually occurring experience, while the other (ἀνδρὸς . . . βέλος, 1350) represents an opponent, and ὑποστῆναι there does not anticipate the outcome of the contest.

Death need not be understood as an event or experience, then, because the usage of related verbs and the immediate context allow us to view it as an opponent instead.[30] The degree of personification *necessarily* entailed by this interpretation is slight, comparable to what is required to understand Plato *Phaedo* 68D and 88B, or even expressions as common as θάνατον φυγεῖν.[31] On the other hand, spectators would add appropriate depth to Heracles' immediate meaning with any degree of personification they might imagine, as well as any associations with his military valor and other labors they might entertain. Indeed, if *Heracles* 1351 deserves full discussion because it comes at the climax of the play, it deserves it no less because of these largely unexplored associations. In what follows, my defense of θάνατον complete, I sketch some benefits that accrue to it on this level.

Some full-fledged personifications of Death are well known. As the figure who, along with his brother Sleep, removes the body of Sarpedon from the battlefield, he is not endowed with military attributes by Homer,[32] but visual artists sometimes

30. It is in this sense that I believe English "brave death" is similarly versatile (cf. n. 4 above). Readers are invited to test this hypothesis by considering whether the sentence on p. 252 above beginning "Just as those who ὑπομένουσιν" caused them any difficulty. Note that the choice between "opponent" and "event or experience" is a matter of argumentative strategy: it is for the category of personal objects that the analogy with other verbs can be claimed and is, I believe, strong enough to defend θάνατον. This argument does not require an answer to the question whether death can be understood simultaneously as "opponent" and as "event or experience" at *Her.* 1351, but of course it only stands to gain from that possibility. Similarly, I reject the paraphrases "temptation" or "threat" of death because they are not supported at the level of lexicon or syntax; to the extent that death as "opponent" represents a threat or temptation, these notions remain contextually relevant, but the crucial point is that the syntactic argument is independent of them. I note here that two of Kranz's paraphrases ("Herr sein über den . . . Tod" and "die Überwindung des Todesgedankens") point towards but fall well short of, and in any case do not argue for, the idea proposed here.

31. Oscillation between ordinary idiom, extended analogy, and metaphor or allegory is well illustrated by two passages of Pl. *Ap.* that again draw on the hoplite context. At 28D–29A, Socrates says, among other things, that he will not leave his station (λίποιμι τὴν τάξιν) through fear or death or anything else; at 38E–39B, he speaks of death running slower than wickedness but fast enough to overtake him.

32. Death's gentleness in contrast to figures like Ker and Gorgo is often emphasized: so E. Vermeule, *Aspects of Death in Early Greek Art and Poetry* (Berkeley, 1979), 37–41, 145–50; J.-P. Vernant, *Mortals and Immortals* (Princeton, 1991), 95–110; and many earlier scholars. Vermeule writes that "death is a negative, a cessation, an inversion of life, but not a physical enemy" (37). This may be true of Death's one fully

choose to depict him this way.[33] In tragedy, dying and distressed characters invoke Death (often as παιών/παιάν or ἰατρός) and ask him to bring a speedy release.[34] These passages sometimes even evoke a military context different from the one under consideration here: Death as ally against (worse) evils.[35] But Death is just as clearly an opponent in other situations. Phrynichus and Euripides both brought him on stage in their versions of the Alcestis legend; Euripides certainly and Phrynichus probably told of Heracles' wrestling bout with him.[36] That Death is a god who cannot be appeased by cult is the subject of Aeschylus *Niobe* frag. 161 (cf. Eur. *Alc.* 424); the implications are likewise sinister when he is mentioned as a "parent" at Sophocles *Trachiniae* 834, Euripides *Troades* 769. Although Death does not appear as a character in Euripides *Medea,* the Chorus lament that sometimes he is φροῦδος ἐς Ἅιδου . . . προφέρων σώματα τέκνων (1110–11). Various expressions in which personification is minimal nevertheless contain the germ of a struggle with Death.[37] Many figures more or less similar to Death behave in similar ways. It would be easy to list passages where they are imagined as opponents, but it is hardly necessary; no one will deny that death fits easily into such company, while life does not.[38]

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personified appearance in the *Iliad* but does not do justice to many of the passages she cites on p. 39 with nn. 65–66 (e.g., *Od.* 3.236–37, where θάνατον is object of ἀλαλκέμεν). Vermeule is able to trace the gentle aspect of death to Alcman and beyond, but the ogreish and hostile aspects present in tragedy (which falls outside the scope of her study) also have an archaic predecessor in Hes. *Th.* 764–66. Her concession that this passage represents a "perhaps more implacable Death" (150) is a significant understatement.

33. In the most famous scene, the rf. calyx crater in the Metropolitan Museum of Art by Euphronius (ca. 515 B.C.E.), Sleep and Death are bearded hoplites with wings. A few years earlier, the same painter had rendered them simply as bearded hoplites (without wings). The iconography remained fluid, though in the Sarpedon scenes (which, along with non-mythical funerary scenes directly inspired by them, account for practically all of the vase paintings of Death), a trend towards youthfulness and gentleness (including nakedness) runs its course by the early fifth century. See *LIMC* VII 1.904–8, 2.616–18 (J. Bažant); H. A. Shapiro, *Personifications in Greek Art* (Zurich, 1993), 132–65, 246–55. No such trend is evident in the much more widely-ranging literary sources. Aeschylus treated the Sarpedon legend in his *Carians* or *Europa;* Death probably brought the corpse on stage with Sleep at the end, but nothing is known of his appearance.

34. Aesch. *Phil.* frag. 255, Soph. *Aj.* 854, *Phil.* 797, *Phil. in Troy* frag. 698, Eur. *Hipp.* 1373, adesp. 369a, 371; cf. Soph. *OC* 1574–78, where Death is not named.

35. Aesch. frag. 353 (ῥῦμα), Soph. *OC* 1220 (ἐπίκουρος).

36. Eur. *Alc.* 69, 843–49, 1140–42; cf. Phryn. frag. 2. This Thanatos type, often said to derive from folk belief, is certainly represented on only one vase, a white-ground lekythos from a woman's grave in Attica (Shapiro, *Personifications,* pp. 164–65, no. 109). On a late sixth-century Etruscan rod-tripod in London (BM 588 = *LIMC* I 1.541 s.v. Alkestis no. 59) a bearded, winged figure (Thanatos?) carrying a woman (Alcestis?) is pursued by Heracles and Hermes; cf. K. Schefold, *Gods and Heroes in Late Archaic Greek Art* (Cambridge, 1992), 149–50. In the plays Thanatos carried a sword, but apparently only in order to cut a hair from his victim's head (Phryn. frag. 3, Eur. *Alc.* 74). According to Pherecydes (*FGrHist* 3 F 119 = Σ ADGe Hom. *Il.* 6.153), Zeus sent Thanatos against Sisyphus, who caught and bound him. Aeschylus probably dramatized these events in his *Sisyphus;* satyr plays by the same name were written by Euripides and Critias.

37. E.g., οὐκ ἔστιν θανάτου παρατροπά, *Ion* 1229, τῷ σώματι / θάνατον ἀμῦναι, *Her.* 193–94 (cf. Hom. *Od.* 3.236–37, Pind. *Ol.* 10.105; see below, n. 43), θανάτου προβολάν, *Or.* 1487; cf. *Alc.* 694 σὺ γοῦν ἀναιδῶς διεμάχου τὸ μὴ θανεῖν. Lack of context leaves *Aegeus* frag. 11 unclear.

38. I give only one example, both because it involves Hades (called ἀδάμαστος at Hom. *Il.* 9.158), the figure of death most suitable for high poetry, and because it shows how naturally Greek achieves what we might call a continuum of personification. No martial metaphor necessarily inheres in expressions of the type "death is near" (e.g., *Alc.* 671, *Her.* 752, *IT* 886, *Phoen.* 880, *Or.* 1044; Hades substituting for death *Alc.* 268, *IT* 486). But Death is literally near at *Alc.* 24, 844–45, and so with Hades at Soph. *Ant.* 580–81, which evokes a battle-line: φεύγουσι γάρ τοι χοἱ θρασεῖς, ὅταν πέλας / ἤδη τὸν Ἅιδην εἰσορῶσι τοῦ βίου. Such passages could be multiplied for Ares, Moira, Ker, and so on, but not Life, which is occasionally apostrophized (e.g., in the form βιοτή at Eur. frags. 791, 916) but rarely if ever personified in Greek art and poetry. I also just mention that the idea of *indomita mors,* variously expressed, remains common (e.g., Hor. *Carm.* 2.14.4 with Nisbet and Hubbard's note).

The well-worn topics of combat and mortality call forth a perceptible striving after variety of expression, even paradox.[39] A striking and controversial example occurs earlier in *Heracles:* after drawing an analogy with his past career, Heracles pithily sums up his duty to protect his children in a rhetorical question (580–81): τῶν δ' ἐμῶν τέκνων / οὐκ ἐκπονήσω θάνατον; The only well-established meaning of the verb ("complete, accomplish") does not meet the contextual need for Heracles to say that he is going to prevent the death of his children. How to explain this is disputed, as is the further question whether Euripides intended his audience to work through the usual meaning and register its implications on their way to an understanding (e.g., "labor to avert") that suits the context.[40] Similar issues arise in connection with an expression only a little earlier. At the end of her long rhesis (275–311), in which she aims to imitate her husband (μίμημ' ἀνδρός, 294) and exhorts Amphitryon to join her and Heracles' children in a dignified death (τόλμα μεθ' ἡμῶν θάνατον, ὃς μένει σ' ὅμως, 307), Megara says (309–11):

> τὰς τῶν θεῶν γὰρ ὅστις ἐκμοχθεῖ τύχας
> πρόθυμός ἐστιν, ἡ προθυμία δ' ἄφρων·
> ὃ χρὴ γὰρ οὐδεὶς μὴ χρεὼν θήσει ποτέ.

Here we must interpret ἐκμοχθεῖ in a sense not found elsewhere, "strives hard to avoid."[41]

These arresting expressions occur at the play's earlier dramatic climaxes, the nadir and zenith, respectively, of Heracles' career. If their prominent location suggests that Euripides is aiming at memorable and provocative expressions of ideas he associates closely with Heracles' tragedy, this impression is borne out by their content. Both contexts involve τύχη, πόνος, and courage—what in modern terms we would call the hero's self-definition.[42] As a further illustration, immediately after the rhetorical

39. Thus A. Michelini writes that at *Her.* 1351 the paradosis, if right, "can be understood only as a kind of riddle" (*Euripides and the Tragic Tradition* [Madison, 1987], p. 265, n. 148). Although this somewhat overstates the case, the examples about to be discussed in the text encourage the view that Euripides wanted the climactic declaration to be striking.

40. The first serious attempt to establish the contextually required meaning "labor to avert" was made by J. Bremer, "Euripides *Heracles* 581," *CQ* 22 (1972): 236–40, who argues that even though ἐκ- had faded to (at most) an indicator of verbal aspect (i.e., completion) in the usage of ἐκπονεῖν (best exemplified, as it happens, by Euripides himself in over a dozen instances), Euripides here (re-?)actualized the latent potential of the preverb to signal removal (240). Bond rejects this explanation and proposes, without argument, "Will I not exert myself over my children's mortal danger?" Bremer also argues that the common meaning of the verb imposes a "first understanding" followed by "a momentary state of being puzzled," which in turn is quickly resolved by the immediate context, but not without leaving subconscious traces that prove to be appropriate when Heracles in fact "accomplishes" the death of his children. While Bond finds this suggestion attractive, it is ruled "out of the question" by J. Diggle (*Studies on the Text of Euripides* [Oxford, 1981], p. 112, n. 2), who considers "the traditional rendering . . . fully defended by the use of ἐκμοχθεῖν at *Herc.* 309." I side with Bremer on both issues; on ἐκμοχθεῖν, see next note. It is amusing to note that Herwerden, cited by Bond, replaced θάνατον with βίοτον at 581; the conjecture does not rate mention in the apparatus of Murray, Diggle, or Lee.

41. So most editors, including Diggle, *Studies,* p. 112, n. 2; cf. Bremer, "*Heracles* 581," p. 238, n. 2. Bond interprets "*toils through* the τύχαι," which suits some occurrences of the verb but not others, where ἐκμοχθεῖν resembles ἐκπονεῖν in that something is produced by the action of the verb (e.g., *Her.* 1369, *Supp.* 451, *El.* 307). Moreover, Bond does not succeed in rendering this sense plausible in this context: one who "toils through" heaven-sent τύχαι is not trying to make what is necessary not necessary.

42. Many believe that Euripides shaped the heroic self-definition of his Heracles with Sophocles' Ajax in mind; see e.g., J. Gibert, *Change of Mind in Greek Tragedy,* Hypomnemata 108 (Göttingen, 1995), 135–43. In our context, note especially *Aj.* 650 ἐκαρτέρουν τότε (Ajax contrasts his former stubbornness with his

question of 580–81, Heracles implies the answer with the words οὐ καλλίνικος ὡς πάροιθε λέξομαι (581–82). This kind of awareness of his reputation runs right through the play (cf. ὁ κλεινὸς Ἡρακλῆς at 12 and 1414) but is especially prominent here, at 1250 (ὁ πολλὰ δὴ τλὰς Ἡρακλῆς), and in the words leading up to his decision at 1351, where he reasons from his reputation as a fighter.[43] The verb ἐγκαρτερεῖν, like ἐκμοχθεῖν and ἐκπονεῖν, expresses the essential Heracles. Although he is καρτερός in both the senses "steadfast" and "strong,"[44] we get the most out of this moment if we can imagine him as steadfast while being strong, while engaged, that is, in a struggle that resembles many of his other labors.[45]

Indeed many of Heracles' traditional labors and some of his other exploits are to be seen as, in some sense, struggles with death.[46] Candidates include the apples of the Hesperides, Geryon, Cerberus, the wounding of Hades, the rescue or attempted rescue of Theseus and Pirithous, and encounters with Old Age, the Old Man of the Sea, and of course Death himself.[47] If some items in this list are open to debate, the

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present professed softness; for him being καρτερός means dying, for Heracles living) and 669 τὰ καρτερώτατα (which in yielding to their opposites cease to exist). As thought-provoking as this comparison is, it will not yield a persuasive argument bearing on the text of *Her.* 1351.

43. To δειλία at 1348 cf. 174–75. Heracles' manner of fighting and the significance of his struggles with wild beasts were put on trial at 140–235. This scene has troubled many interpreters, especially those occupied with the issue of the play's unity; it has been discussed recently by M. Padilla, "The Gorgonic Archer: Danger of Sight in Euripides' *Heracles*," *CW* 86 (1992): 1–12; and D. George, "Euripides' *Heracles* 140–235: Staging and the Stage Iconography of Heracles' Bow," *GRBS* 35 (1994): 145–57. I note only that when deciding to stand firm in the face of death, Heracles invokes precisely the hoplite style of fighting so highly praised by Lycus (159–64) and considered less σοφόν than archery by Amphitryon (190–203); cf. also 1099, 1190–94, 1378–85. In τῷ σώματι / θάνατον ἀμῦναι (193–94) it is possible to see death as an opponent. Eur. elsewhere uses the middle with persons (198, *Supp.* 529, *IT* 299, *Or.* 269), but cf. θῆρας *Rhes.* 787, τὸν βάρβαρον Pl. *Leg.* 692E.

44. καρτερός and related words were probably particularly, though of course not exclusively, associated with Heracles (on Ajax, see n. 42 above). Asked who he is, the disguised Dionysus in Ar. *Ran.* answers, ludicrously, Ἡρακλῆς ὁ καρτερός (464); cf. the reference to Heracles' καρτερικὴ ψυχή in Herodorus *FGrHist* 31 F 14 (c. 400 B.C.E.?). In epic, Heracles is κρατερός at Hom. *Il.* 5.392, [Hes.] *Scut.* 52, frag. 195.52, καρτερόθυμος at Hom. *Od.* 21.25, and κρατερόφρονα at *Il.* 14.324, [Hes.] *Scut.* 458, Ap. Rhod. *Argon.* 1.122; cf. κρατεραίχμαν at Pind. *Isthm.* 6.38; other epic epithets of Heracles include θρασυκάρδιος [Hes.] *Scut.* 448 and the combination θρασυμέμνονα θυμολέοντα at Hom. *Il.* 5.639, *Od.* 11.267.

45. Those who propose βίοτον might argue that the more passive endurance entailed by Heracles' continued life, the more effective the contrast with his past merely physical labors. That Heracles' last struggle is of a new kind is indeed important, but of course I am not claiming that Heracles literally fights Death. His metaphorical struggle has elements of both continuity and difference when compared with the other labors (cf. Gibert, *Change of Mind,* 140–43). Tragic and psychological dimensions of Heracles' ongoing struggle with death are explored by J. Assaël, "L'*Héraclès* d'Euripide et les ténèbres infernales," *LEC* 62 (1994): 313–26, esp. 323–26. Such speculations are not of course crucial to my argument, but it is again telling that θάνατον at 1351 (which Assaël reads without comment) can add significantly to them, while βίοτον cannot.

46. The source material on Heracles is vast. There are ancient summary accounts in Apollod. *Bibl.* 2.4.8–7.8, D. S. 4.8–39; see also Preller-Robert 2:422–675. For interpretation, cf. G. K. Galinsky, *The Herakles Theme* (Oxford, 1972); the commentaries of Wilamowitz (especially 2:1–107) and Bond; and W. Burkert, *Structure and History in Greek Mythology and Ritual* (Berkeley, 1979), 78–98. On the mythical struggles with death, see also H. A. Shapiro, "*Heros Theos:* The Death and Apotheosis of Herakles," *CW* 77 (1983): 7–18, and J. Fontenrose, *Python* (Berkeley, 1959), 321–64 (who however is incautious in identifying death-figures).

47. The first three are related in the first stasimon of *Her.:* Hesperides (394–99), Geryon (422–24), journey to Hades (425–35, here without Cerberus, who was mentioned at 24–25). Of these, the Hesperides are not among the twelve labors represented on the metopes of the temple of Zeus at Olympia, but Bond notes that "[i]n the later canon this is the last labour, which sets the seal on Heracles' achievement" (the position held by Atlas in Olympia). Geryon: see next note. Wounding of Hades: Hom. *Il.* 5.395–402 (cf. Pind. *Ol.* 9.28–35), where the words ἐν Πύλῳ ἐν νεκύεσσιν are an ancient puzzle but may refer to Hades' domain. Recall also the alternate version of the Alcestis legend, in which she reaches the underworld (Pl. *Symp.* 179B, Dale's commentary on Eur. *Alc.* [Oxford, 1954], pp. xi–xii). A series of early fourth-century Attic rf. vases showing

main point is not. Moreover, a factor possibly influencing Euripides' selection of labors and distribution of emphasis in the first stasimon (348–450) was the desire to stress labors that suggest victory over death.[48] In the first antistrophe of the second stasimon (655–72), the Chorus continue the theme by saying that if the gods were wise κατ' ἄνδρας, those who bear a "clear stamp of excellence" would have a "double youth" and, like Heracles, return to the light of the sun after (apparent) death.[49]

Euripides also knew that his audience was familiar with legends of Heracles' immortality, agelessness, and marriage to Hebe, although exactly how he meant to play his version off against these notions is open to differing interpretations.[50] He was writing at a time when the mythical and religious significance of Heracles had recently undergone or was about to undergo major transformation. Walter Burkert writes, "For the anxieties of emerging individualism, the really important achievement of Heracles was that he could overcome Old Age and Death." And again, "Heracles has broken the terrors of death. . . . [He] contained the potential to shatter the limits of Greek religion."[51] Euripides was not necessarily out to shatter Greek religion when he had his Heracles, asserting himself in preparation for his final struggle,

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Heracles with an old man holding a cornucopia used to be taken as scenes of an "abduction of Hades/Pluton." The old man is now generally identified as Melicertes Palaemon, who was worshipped with Heracles Pancrates in a sanctuary discovered in 1952 in the Ilissus region of Athens; cf. E. Vikela, *Die Weihreliefs aus dem Athener Pankrates-Heiligtum am Ilissos* (Berlin, 1994), 118–19. Theseus and Pirithous: R. Vollkommer, *Herakles in the Art of Classical Greece* (Oxford, 1988), 23–24; H. Herter, *RE* Suppl. 13 (1973): 1177–83; H. J. Mette, *ZPE* 50 (1983): 13–19. Γῆρας: Attic rf. vases from the first half of the fifth century (Bond on 637–54, 649; Shapiro, *Personifications,* 89–94; *LIMC* IV 1.180–82, 2.100–101). The ἅλιος γέρων/Nereus: Attic bf. vases from the mid-sixth century (Burkert, *Structure and History,* p. 95, n. 13; *LIMC* VI 1.826–29, 2.519–22 [cat. no. 16–51] s.v. Nereus [M. Pipili]).

48. Bond (in notes on 359ff. and individual labors), rightly detects a tendency to replace the slaying of Peloponnesian monsters with labors that enhance the image of Heracles as a divinely favored Panhellenic civilizer, and the suggestion that Euripides may have had another motive is not crucial to my argument. I merely note that Geryon, who as Bond says (on 423–24) "was not notably vicious," runs counter to the main tendency. Bond also writes that "[i]f Euripides thought of Geryon as a second Hades (for this see Preller-Robert II 465ff.), he gives no hint of it here." But Geryon's underworld associations are secure; besides Preller-Robert, see e.g., Nisbet and Hubbard on Hor. *Carm.* 2.14.8; Vermeule, *Aspects of Death,* 141–44; Schefold, *Gods and Heroes,* 121–29. Euripides did not need to hint at the symbolic dimension any more than in the cases of the Hesperides and Hades/Cerberus.

49. In 660 most editors accept Reiske's καὶ θανόντες for **L**'s unmetrical and otherwise unsatisfactory καὶ θνατοί.

50. On the much-discussed questions surrounding Heracles' apotheosis, see T. C. W. Stinton, "The Apotheosis of Heracles from the Pyre," *JHS* Suppl. xv (1987): 1–16 (= *Collected Papers* [Oxford, 1990], 493–507); J. Wilkins, *Euripides: "Heraclidae"* (Oxford, 1993) on *Heracl.* 910–18, 912, 915–16. Wilkins writes, "Vase paintings of Heracles being introduced into Olympia date from the mid-sixth century"; the earliest literary references, including the transparently symbolic marriage to Hebe (Hom. *Od.* 11.601–4, Hes. *Th.* 950–55, frag. 25.26–33, 229) probably belong to the same period or a little earlier. Various embellishments, including the pyre, are first attested later. At several points in the play, Euripides hints at topics with a special relevance for Attic myth and cult. For example, Heracles refers to his initiation into the Eleusinian mysteries at 613 (cf. Bond ad loc. and R. Parker, *Athenian Religion: A History* [Oxford, 1996], 98–100), and the fact that Pallas Athena intervenes during his madness to stop him from killing his father (1002–6) reminds us of the close relationship between the hero and that goddess so noticeable in Athenian art. At 1326–33, Theseus offers to give Heracles τεμένη and rename them after him; cf. Bond on 1326–33, 1331–33; A. Verbanck-Piérard, "Héraclès héros ou dieu," in *Héraclès d'une rive à l'autre de la Mediterranée,* ed. C. Bonnet and C. Jourdain-Annequin (Brussels and Rome, 1992), 51–65, at 63–64; and see further next note.

51. The first quotation is from Burkert, *Structure and History,* 97. Burkert does not assign a date to "emerging individualism," but he mentions "that Eleusis took advantage of the Heracles tradition and his journey to Hades as early as the sixth century" in the same context (cf. previous note); certainly Euripides may claim a share in "emerging individualism," not least through his depiction of characters like Heracles. The second quotation is from *Greek Religion,* tr. J. Raffan (Cambridge, MA, 1985), 211. At issue here is the religious conception of Heracles as victor over death as it developed in Panhellenic myth and in some cults.

say ἐγκαρτερήσω θάνατον. The declaration resonates, however, both with the earlier significant scenes and themes of Euripides' own play and with profound meanings of the Heracles myth. We should require very good reasons indeed to tamper with it.[52]

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In a series of articles, A. Verbanck-Piérard has argued that "double cult" of Heracles as hero and god, often presumed to stand in a close relationship with the myth of his apotheosis, is weakly attested and open to dispute, while in Attica, at any rate, his cult is almost exclusively divine. See the summary, with bibliography, in "Héraclès l'Athénien," in *Culture et cité: L'Avènement d'Athènes à l'époque archaïque,* ed. A. Verbanck-Piérard and D. Viviers (Brussels, 1995), 103–25, esp. 118–20. (I am grateful to the anonymous referee for *CP* for the references to this author's work in this and the previous note.) This background, along with the play's overt hints at the Attic Heracles (cf. previous note) presumably affected the audience's response to the crisis Euripides crafted for his hero in some way. While I would maintain that the poet is primarily concerned with exploring the myth at a higher level of generality, I am only too aware of the difficulties involved in such a distinction and such an analysis. The notion of Heracles as *mortis victor* continued to develop, with all the variation one would expect; for examples, see C. Schneider, "Herakles der Todüberwinder," *WZLeipzig* 7 (1957–58): 661–66; J. Fitch, *Seneca's "Hercules Furens": A Critical Text with Introduction and Commentary* (Ithaca, NY, 1987), 17–18, 34–35. Incidentally, at the moment corresponding to *Her.* 1351, Seneca's Hercules says (*Her. F.* 1317) *uiuamus.* Because it does not aim to reproduce Euripides' pointed phrasing and involves significant innovations of its own, Seneca's version does not affect the decision at *Her.* 1351.

52. For their helpful criticism of this article, I would like to thank Anne Groton, David Kovacs, Christopher Shields, and the anonymous referee for *CP.*

WAS CARCINUS I A TRAGIC PLAYWRIGHT?: A RESPONSE

In an intriguing recent note in this journal, Kenneth S. Rothwell has argued that Carcinus I (*TrGF* 21) wrote not tragedies, as is generally supposed, but comedies.[1] Rothwell effectively demonstrates that very little is known of Carcinus' career. All the same, the bulk of what evidence there is still suggests that he was a tragic rather than a comic poet.

That Carcinus was a dramatic poet of some sort is clear from Aristophanes, *Pax* 792–95, where mention is made of a δρᾶμα belonging to him that was, allegedly, strangled during the night by a weasel.[2] As Rothwell (pp. 241–42) points out, however, the poet's presence in the catalogue of tragic victors at the City Dionysia at *IG* II^2 2318.81 merely reflects Kirchner's adoption of a suggestion made by Lipsius, and ΚΑ[ΛΛΙΣΤΡΑΤΟΣ (*TrGF* 38) or the name of some other, otherwise unknown poet might just as easily be restored. Nor does Strepsiades' mocking attribution of the words ἰώ μοί μοι to "one of the δαίμονες of Carcinus" at Ar. *Nub.* 1260–61 prove anything about the genre in which the latter composed, particularly since the passage continues with what Σ^{RVENp} identifies as a quotation from a play by one of Carcinus' sons, the tragedian Xenocles (Ar. *Nub.* 1264–65 ~ *TrGF* 33 F 2).[3] In support of his own thesis, Rothwell cites the claim of Σ^{RVΓ} *Pax* 795 that the play referred to at *Pax*

Thanks are due two anonymous referees, whose comments and criticisms substantially improved this note.

1. Kenneth S. Rothwell, "Was Carcinus I a Tragic Playwright?" *CP* 89 (1994): 241–45. Cf. Platnauer on *Pax* 791–95. The discussion that follows amounts to a commentary on the evidence set forth by Snell at *TrGF* I. 128–31 and is a defense of his position.

2. καὶ γὰρ ἔφασχ' ὁ πατὴρ ὃ παρ' ἐλπίδας / εἶχε τὸ δρᾶμα γαλῆν τῆς ἑσπέρας ἀπάγξαι.

3. Rothwell, "Carcinus," 242–43, citing Dover on *Nub.* 1261.